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THAT T-REX IS MINE! A NOTE ON THE 
MONTANA SUPREME COURT DECISION 





What is a mineral? Normally, when minerals come up in conversation, 
the average person conjures up colorful rock formations bought at a gift or 
pawn shop. Maybe someone in biology would consider minerals to be a 
product of the food a person eats for nutritional benefit. However, many 
landowners are familiar with mineral interests. These interests generally 
include the right to egress and ingress the property and extract oil and 
natural gas resources. Generally, all considerations are taken into account 
when drafting and negotiating parting the estate's surface and mineral 
rights, but what happens when an uncontemplated substance appears and 
does not fall in the purview or consideration of that deed? What happens 
when sandstone is found and taken from the land? Who would get to 
benefit from that resource? The Montana Supreme Court addressed these 
differing understandings in Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC.
1
 The case 
presented a legal duel for one of the best Tyrannosaurus-Rex fossils ever 
                                                                                                             
  Bryce Hayden is a current student at the University of Oklahoma, College of Law 
and is on track to graduate in May of 2022.  
 1. Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC, 924 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2019), certifying questions 
to 2020 MT 131, 400 Mont. 135, 464 P.3d 80. 
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found as well as an encapsulated duel between a Ceratopsian and Teropod 
that made national headlines.
2
 
As exploration and extraction of minerals of land increased, many 
questions on the ownership of these resources came into question. Even in 
the twenty-first century, states struggle to allocate resources to the 
appropriate owner if they are different and uphold the mineral deed's 
interpretation to encompass or exclude the resource. The Montana Supreme 
Court has currently set forth a decision impacting Montana’s resource 
ownership questions and a decision that could have implications in other 
states. The question was whether valuable dinosaur bones belong to a 
surface right owner or the mineral right owner. The court created a three-
factor test that considers the language of minerals in the deed, consideration 
of its rarity and value, and how the substance relates and affects the 
surface.
3
 However, the majority overlooked many considerations of 
precedent on the issue and granted the valuable resources to the wrong 
person.  
This note will present the precedent that led towards the Murray 
decisions. It will then explain the underlying facts and procedure to reach 
the Montana Supreme Court. Further, it will go into detail about the 
majority opinion as well as the dissenting opinion. The article then will 
proceed to explain why Montana and other states should consider the fact 
comparisons of the dissent more persuasive than the majority, with a 
narrowly decided case such as Murray has presented with incredibly high 
stakes.  
II. Previous Law and Precedent 
A. Moving from Texas to Montana: Foundational case in mineral 
determination: Heinatz v. Allen
4
 
Heinatz is a case the Montana Supreme Court relies on and is the basis 
for the Montana precedent. Land in Travis and Williamson counties in 
Texas was owned in whole by the petitioner's mother.
5
 The mother 
conveyed the mineral rights to the defendant and surface rights to the 
                                                                                                             
 2. Will the Public Ever Get to See the “Dueling Dinosaurs”? SMITHSONIAN MAGAZINE 
(July/August 2017), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/public-ever-see-
dueling-dinosaurs-180963676/. 
 3. Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC, 924 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2019), certifying questions 
to 2020 MT 131, 400 Mont. 135, 464 P.3d 80. 
 4. Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 217 S.W.2d 994 (1949). 
 5. Id. at 995. 
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 The defendants then started extracting limestone commercially.
7
 
Petitioners claimed damages from the extraction of limestone on land in 
which they owned only the mineral rights.
8
 The court had to determine how 
limestone in Texas "relat[es] to the surface of the land, its use and value, 
and the method and effect of its removal."
9
 The opinion focused on how the 
stripped or quarried limestone impacted the land.
10
 Another comparison is 
that limestone is related to gravel or even caliche, which is deposited 
similarly to limestone.
11
 Using inferences from an assortment of cases, 
Texas Supreme Court distinguished sand from other minerals using special 




Additionally, there was a question about the limestone's extraction and 
how it can affect the value of the land and the surface. Using the Kentucky 
case Rudd v. Hayden, the court concluded that the interpretation of what 
constituted a mineral hinged on additional words such as cement to add 
limestone and other minerals into the word's original meaning.
13
 The Texas 
Supreme Court concluded and reinforced the notion that limestone is just a 
building material similar to sand and has no rare or exceptional value.
14
 
B. Montana's First Impression: Farley v. Booth Brothers Land & Livestock 
Co. 
The decision in Farley v. Booth Brothers Land & Livestock Co. 
incorporated Heinatz and its reasoning into Montana's precedent.
15
 The 
defendant owned a ranch subject to multiple agreements from the Western 
Energy Company to use the surface of the land for mining purposes.
16
 A 
plaintiff filed a complaint claiming Western's usage of the surface.
17
 The 
issue at hand was whether scoria taken from the land should count as a 
                                                                                                             
 6. Id.  
 7. Id.  
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 996.  
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 996-97.  
 12. Id. at 997. 
 13. Id.  
 14. Id. at 1000. 
 15. 270 Mont. 1, 890 P.2d 377 (1995). 
 16. Id. at 378. 
 17. Id. at 379. 
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mineral or subject to the surface.
18
 At the time the case was decided, a 
legally defined mineral included:  
any ore, rock, or substance, other than oil, gas, bentonite, clay, 
coal, sand, gravel, phosphate rock, or uranium taken from below 
the surface or from the surface of the earth for the purpose of 
milling, concentration, refinement, smelting, manufacturing, or 
other subsequent use of processing or for stockpiling for future 
use, refinement, or smelting.
19
  
A contention that arises later is that the definition of "mineral" can 
change due to the context and separate sentences. The court used Hovden v. 
Lind to exemplify that when a substance is not exceptionally rare and 
valuable, then it does not qualify as a mineral.
20
 The court also relied on a 
similar case from Oklahoma, which held that normal substances become 
minerals if "they are rare and exceptional in character or possess a peculiar 
property giving them special value."
21
 For example, scoria was listed as 
ordinary by its use in roadmaking, making it not a mineral. Interestingly, 
the court could not determine scoria's alternative use because the lower 
court failed to raise the issue, but the court recognized it could change its 
determination.
22
 The court then created its precedent for Montana heavily 
relying on the determination of the rarity or special use of the substance in 
question. The precedent is: 
substances such as sand, gravel and limestone are not minerals 
within the ordinary and natural meaning of the word unless they 
are rare and exceptional in character or possess a peculiar 
property giving them special value, as for example sand that is 
valuable for making glass and limestone of such quality that it 
may profitably be manufactured into cement. Such substances, 
when they are useful only for building and road-making 
purposes, are not regarded as minerals in the ordinary and 




                                                                                                             
 18. Id.  
 19. Id. (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-4-303). 
 20. Id. at 380 (citing Hovden v. Lind, 301 N.W.2d, 374 (N.D. 1981)). 
 21. Id. at 380 (citing Holland v. Dolese Co., 540 P.2d 549 (Okla. 1975)). 
 22. Id. at 380-381.  
 23. Id. at 380 (1995) (quoting Holland, 540 P.2d at 550-551) (emphasis in original).  
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C. Prior Use of the Test: Hart v. Craig 
In this dispute, the appellee purchased the land from the appellant in the 
late 1980s, with the appellant reserving the mineral rights.
24
 The deed listed 
normal minerals and additional other minerals in the land.
25
 Appellee began 
taking and selling sandstone off of the land. The appellant brought suit 
claiming that sandstone is a mineral and therefore was part of the 
reservation in the conveyance.
26
 In addressing this question of gravel, the 
Montana Supreme Court followed Farley by ruling that the substance must 
be rare and exceptional or used for a specific purpose, such as being refined 
or processed.
27
 The court deemed sandstone as ordinary and not of high 
value because of its use in making everyday items like cement and glass.
28
 
III. Statement of the Case 
A. General Facts 
Rancher George Severson of Garfield County, Montana, owned the 
estate at issue, which is operated as a ranch.
29
 The land was leased in 1983 
by Mary Ann and Lige Murray (Murrays), who then created a partnership 
with Severson to ranch the property.
30
 In 2005, the mineral and surface 
estate was conveyed and separated.
31
 A purchase agreement conveyed the 
Murrays to own the entire surface estate and a minority interest in the 
mineral estate.
32
 The direct language of the mineral deed is as follows: 
all right title and interest in and to all of the oil, gas, 
hydrocarbons, and minerals in, on and under, and that may be 
produced from the [property] . . . together with the right, if any, 
to ingress and egress at all times for the purpose of mining, 
drilling, exploring, operating, and developing said lands for oil, 
gas, hydrocarbons, and minerals, and storing, handling, 
transporting, and marketing the same therefrom with the rights to 
                                                                                                             
 24. Hart v. Craig, 2009 MT 283, 352 Mont. 209, 216 P.3d 197. 
 25. Id. at 197. 
 26. Id. at 198 
 27. Id.  
 28. Id.  
 29. Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC, 464 P.3d 80, 81.  
 30. Id. 
 31. Id.  
 32. Id.  
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From the available facts, three critical circumstances existed at the time 
of the conveyance. The first is that neither party had a suspicion that the 
ranch possessed the fossils.
34
 Second, no party considered the fossils and 
their effect after the 2005 transfer of the mineral rights.
35
 Lastly, there was 
no specific intent about who would be entitled to ownership of the fossils.
36
 
The parties conceded they were of high value and rarity.
37
 The majority 
mineral estate split ownership into thirds between Robert Severson, BEJ 
Minerals, LLC, and RTWF LLC, which then were combined to represent 
BEJ as a group.
38
 From 2006 to 2013, the Murrays found the fossilized 
remains of a Ceratopsian and Teropod fighting, a Triceratops foot and 
skull, and a nearly complete Tyrannosaurus rex.
39
 The fossils’ were held in 
escrow, while their value ranged into the millions of dollars.  
B. Procedural Posture 
For the sake of clarity, the Montana Supreme Court referred to these 
separate proceedings as Murray I and Murray II. The initial suit and 
movement for summary judgment served as Murray I.
40
 Litigation started in 
2013 when BEJ filed for an ownership interest in the fossils as the mineral 
owner.
41
 In the Montana Sixteenth Judicial District Court, the Murrays 
sought a declaratory judgment that they own the fossils as the surface right 
owners.
42
 The case was removed to federal court based on diversity 
jurisdiction; as a result, BEJ sought a declaratory judgment for ownership 




Both parties moved for summary judgment and requested the court to 
decide ownership of the fossils.
44
 The district court reasoned the applicable 
                                                                                                             
 33. Id at 81-82 (bracketing and omission in original). 
 34. Id. at 82. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 82. 
 38. Id.  
 39. Id.  
 40. Id. at 81. 
 41. Murray v. Billings Garfield Land Co. (Murray I), 187 F.Supp.3d 1203, 1207 (2016).  
 42. Id. 
 43. Id.  
 44. Id. 
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test to use is Farley, but does not set a precedent from the rule in Heinatz.
45
 
In Farley, the court's interpretation used the plain language of the word 
mineral and claimed the case at hand was similar to the sandstone to the 
fossils found on the property; therefore, the Murrays, as surface right 
owners, kept ownership of the fossils.
46
  
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed Murray I, which then led to its 
opinion becoming Murray II.
47
 The Ninth Circuit held despite 
inconsistencies in the statutory definitions, the statute indicated the fossils 
were, in fact, minerals.
48
 The opinion uses the concession of its monetary 
value to satisfy that prong of the analysis on rarity and value.
49
 The Ninth 
Circuit then en banc certified the question to the Montana Supreme Court to 
determine the issue under state law, given Murray I and Murray II for the 
fact and procedural background.
50
  
IV. Majority Opinion's Analysis 
The Montana Supreme Court first evaluated the standard of review, 
which was abnormal since it was a certifying question from the Ninth 
Circuit. When issuing the certifying question, the Montana Supreme Court 
received the following certifying question "an interpretation of the law as 
applied to the agreed facts underlying the action."
51
 With this standard, the 
majority addressed the issue provided by the Ninth Circuit, "Whether, 
under Montana law, dinosaur fossils constitute 'minerals' for a mineral 
reservation."
52
 The first notion of disagreement stemmed from the 
interpretation of the issue from the Ninth Circuit. The majority formulated 
the opinion to serve as a benchmark for future decisions by creating clear 




The Montana Supreme Court majority first laid out the case law but 
faced conflicting problems of the precedents set in both Farley and Hart. 
The Montana Supreme Court wrestled with whether Heinatz was binding 
                                                                                                             
 45. Id. at 1208. 
 46. Id. at 1209. 
 47. Id.  
 48. Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC, (Murray II), 908 F.3d 437, 444 (2018). 
 49. Id. at 447. 
 50. Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC, 924 F.3d 1070, 1074 (2019).  
 51. Id. at 83 (quoting State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Bush Hog, LLC, 2009 MT 349, ¶ 4, 
353 Mont. 173, 219 P. 3d 1249).  
 52. Id.  
 53. Id.  
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on the court, which the lower courts had previously established that the 
general principles of the case were adopted.
54
 The court moved to use 
Heinatz but doubled back to prioritizing the ordinary and natural meaning 
of the word and the parties' intent otherwise.
55
 The court then used language 
from Murray I and Heinatz to reshape precedent and make a new rule that 
encompasses prior case law.
56
 First, the court highlights in Murray I, "the 
focus of the test articulated by Heinatz does not turn on whether the 
substance is 'rare and exceptional in character.'"
57
 The court built upon this 
to determine that a potential mineral's rarity and value is only one factor of 
the analysis.
58
 Second, the court claimed from Murray I, stating that "a 
material's inclusion in the scientific definition of 'mineral' is not 
determinative."
59
 Additionally, there must no showing of an intention to use 
in the conveying instrument the scientific definition.
60
 The court added 




The new test effectively created by the Montana Supreme Court has 
three factors that contribute to the designation. The first factor is how the 
language of the word "mineral" is used in the deed itself.
62
 The second 
factor pertains to the substance's rarity and value as a critical consideration, 
but the court minimized it to a not directly decisive factor.
63
 Lastly, the 
court looked at the substance's relation to and effect on the surface in its 
third factor.
64
 This last factor is buried in Heinatz as a consideration but 
does not carry much weight in Farley and Hart. The court also added 
principals from Murray I to help come to the decisions on these factors. The 
first is the doubling down that rarity and exceptional in character are only 
an equal factor minimized in the case.
65
 The court also mentioned that 
                                                                                                             
 54. Id.  
 55. Id. at 84. 
 56. Id.  
 57. Id. (quoting Murray v. Billings Garfield Land Co., 187 F.Supp.3d 1203 (D. Mont. 
2016)). 
 58. Id. at 84.  
 59. Id. (quoting Murray v. Billings Garfield Land Co., 187 F.Supp.3d 1203 (D. Mont. 
2016). See also Heinatz v. Allen, 217 S.W.2d 994, 997 (1949). 
 60. See, Murray I, 187 F. Supp. 3d at 1210; See also Heinatz, 217 S.W.2d at 997. 
 61. Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC, 464 P.3d 80, 84.  
 62. Id.  
 63. Id. 
 64. Id.  
 65. See, Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC, 464 P.3d 80, 84.  
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scientific definitions of “mineral” were not determinative unless determined 
to be so in the parties' intent and the conveying instrument.
66
 
A. The Majority's Determination of the Language of "Mineral" as Used in a 
Mineral Deed  
The Montana Supreme Court acknowledged that the prior litigation 
yielded a problem of interpreting and defining "mineral."
67
 The court 
moved to look at "mineral" from the context of an entire sentence rather 
than just the word itself. The context of minerals in the deed is as follows: 
"oil, gas, hydrocarbons, and minerals in, on and under, and that may be 
produced from the [property]."
68
 These combined with the rights of 
"mining, drilling, exploring, operating, and developing said lands for oil, 
gas, hydrocarbons, and minerals"
69
 In also determining "mineral" in this 




Indicating the implications of contract law, the court interpreted the deed 
at the time of contraction to affect the parties' mutual assent. Additionally, 
as required by Montana Statute, when a contract or a deed is reduced to 
writing if possible, the court addressed the writing alone to solve any 
ambiguity.
71
 However, because the prior courts of Murray I and Murray II 
moved the interpretation outside the document's four corners, the Montana 
Supreme Court also elected to do so.
72
 Farley's notion of outside resources, 
where the court used two different definitions of "mineral" under Montana 
statues to determine if scoria meets the definition.
73
 The court also noted it 




                                                                                                             
 66. Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC, 924 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2019), 464 P.3d 80, 
84. 
 67. Id. at 85. 
 68. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202 cmt. d (Am. Law Inst. 
1971)). 
 69. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202 cmt. d (Am. Law Inst. 
1971). 
 70. Id. at 85. 
 71. Mont. Code Ann. § 28-3-303 (West).  
 72. Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC, 464 P.3d 80, 86. 
 73. Id.  
 74. Id. at 86 (citing First United Methodist Church v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 882 F.2d 862, 
869 (4th Cir. 1989)).  
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The majority opinion first relied on the interpretation principles noted in 
Carbon County v. Union Reserve Coal Co.
75
 In Carbon County, the parties 
conveyed "all coal and coal rights."
76
 In that case, the Montana Supreme 
Court had to determine if the conveyance included coal seam methane 
gas.
77
 After declaring that coal and coal seam methane gas were two 
different terms, the court then reasoned expressio unius est exclusion 
alterius (the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another) applies 
commonly in Montana.
78
 The majority then claimed Carbon County was 
analogous to Murray because fossils are excluded in the list of "oil, gas, 
[and] hydrocarbons."
79
 Fossils failed to meet the general grant of minerals 
because fossils were excluded from the language.
80
 Furthermore, the court 




To further the point that mineral and fossils are exclusive terms, the 
majority opinion cited multiple statutory definitions found in Montana. 
These statutes range in the area the area of law, which the majority points to 
Montana's rigorous interpretations as a sign that fossils have never been 
contemplated as a mineral. The first statute was the definition for "Metal 
Mine Reclamation" and lists many substances and their purposes without 
mentioning fossils.
82
 Second, the Uniform Unclaimed Property Act defined 
minerals with a list including gas, oil, sand and gravel, road material, or 
other substances.
83
 Lastly, the majority cites broad tax codes requiring the 
taxes owed on minerals, which omits fossils.
84
 The majority also cited that 
the Murray's did not use the tax code as further evidence.
85
 
The majority then proceeded to assess the reference of "fossil" under 
Montana laws. The term fossil was is in a different title than mineral, under 
Title 22: "Libraries, Art, and Antiques."
86
 This refers to the preservation of 
                                                                                                             
 75. Carbon Cty. v. Union Reserve Coal Co., 271 Mont. 459, 898 P.2d 680, 681-682 
(1995). 
 76. Id. (citing Carbon Cty. v. Union Reserve Coal Co., 271 Mont. 459, 898 P.2d 680, 
681-682 (1995)). 
 77. Id. (citing Carbon Cty., 898 P.2d at 681-82). 
 78. Id. (citing Carbon Cty., 898 P.2d at 681-82). 
 79. Id. at 86-87 (citing Carbon Cty., 898 P.2d at 684). 
 80. Id. at 87.  
 81. Id.  
 82. Id. (quoting MONT CODE ANN. § 82-4-303(16)). 
 83. Murray, 464 P.3d 80, 87 (citing MONT CODE ANN. § 70-9-802(9)). 
 84. Murray, 464 P.3d 80, 87. 
 85. Id. at 88.  
 86. Murray, 464 P.3d 80, 88 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 22-3-107).  
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fossils and other minerals.
87
 The majority also mentioned the statutory 
reference to the official Montana state fossil in Title 1: "General Laws and 
Definitions.”
88
 Even extending outside of statutory interpretations, the 
majority examined the Montana Department of Natural Resources and 
Conversation's use of fossil. The use of "fossil" by the department is in 
regard to paleontological remains and it uses the same listing format as 
those indicating it is expressive and not inclusive of other considerations of 
"minerals."
89
 A further expansion is provided in an excerpt from a 1915 
letter from a paleologist to the Commissioner of the General Land Office.
90
 
After analyzing both sides of "mineral" and "fossil," the majority 
explained the relevance pertaining to the case at hand. The statutory 
interpretations and use of those statutes' words lend a heavy hand to their 
applications' context clues.
91
 All of the mentioned statutes with the words 
were available and constituted a portion of relation to the deed.
92
 The 
majority categorizes this as "overwhelming authority" that the terms are 
exclusive.
93
 The deed is restricted to its apparent objects in which the 
parties intended to contract.
94
 The court further stated that this translates to 
an intention for fossils not to be a part of the minerals conveyed.
95
 The 
majority decided to extend that fossils are under the broad reservation of 
minerals in the conveyance.
96
 The parties could have inserted these 
considerations and failed to do so, rending the consideration outside the 
purview of their intent.
97
 With these considerations, the factor weighs 
towards Murray. 
B. Rarity and the price tag of the mineral composition 
In the second factor, the court ascertained whether the mineral was rare 
and valuable, narrowly only encompassing mineral composition.
98
 The 
difference is subtle but would impact the decision of the factor 
                                                                                                             
 87. Murray, 464 P.3d 80, 88. 
 88. Murray, 464 P.3d 80, 88. (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 22-3-107). 
 89. Id. at 88.  
 90. Id. at 89. 
 91. .Id. at 90.  
 92. Id.  
 93. Id.  
 94. Id.  
 95. Id.  
 96. Id.  
 97. Id.  
 98. Id. at 91 (citing Farley, 270 Mont. at 7-8, 890 P.2d at 380; Hart, ¶¶ 6-7; Heinatz, 
217 S.W.2d at 997).  
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significantly. The alternative would be that parties need only prove how 
valuable and rare the mineral is from a general perspective because fossils 
are not found everywhere and command attention and likely would meet 
this factor handsomely.
99
 The majority declared that to be a unilateral 
decision. It would "neglect to thoroughly examine for the ordinary and 
natural meaning of mineral by failing to account for the use of the 
substance, its relation to the surface, and its method of removal."
100
  
The main reasoning for its actual narrowing of the rule into the contents 
and uses stems from the Heinatz opinion, which states, "In our opinion 
substances . . . are not mineral within the ordinary and natural meaning of 
the word unless they are rare and exceptional in character or possess a 
peculiar property giving them special value."
101
 The majority stated that it 
goes against the ordinary and accepted meaning of "mineral" if aspects like 
usefulness or the content of the mineral render it valuable for refinement 
and economic exploration.
102
 However, Heinatz is merely persuasive, but 
the court claims this notion is reinforced in Farley and Hart.
103
 When 
determining sandstone, in Hart, the court claimed that " this rock is not very 
special, nor is it exceptionally rare and valuable. It does not have to be 
changed, refined or processed to be used commercially."
104
 The court drew 
the comparison from sandstone to fossils because they do not go through 
refinement or processing.  
The majority attempted to draw a line in the literal meaning of rare and 
valuable fossils, but these and others are not rare and valuable in precedent 
terms. If the only question asked was in a literal sense of the words "rare" 
and "valuable," it would be certain that most fossils would qualify. Fossils 
are rare partly due to fossils' exclusivity since they are evidence of 
organisms from years ago in a preserved space. These fossils also help 
bring understanding to the times before humanity and paint a picture of a 
world with different organisms. The court recognized these considerations 
but distinguished the meanings of rare and valuable. The majority relied on 
the Murray I district court opinion, which stated that not all dinosaur fossils 
are considered rare and valuable.
105
 As a result, the fossils do not meet the 
                                                                                                             
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 90-91. 
 101. Id. at 91 (citing Heinatz, 217 S.W.2d at 997).  
 102. Id.  
 103. Id.  
 104. Id. (quoting Hart, ¶ 5) (emphasis omitted). 
 105. Murray, 464 P.3d 80, 91 (citing Murray I, 187 F. Supp. 3d at 1207). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol7/iss1/5
2021]      A Note on Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC 117 
 
 
rare and valuable standard because of their mineral properties.
106
 The 
majority then pulls from the dissenting opinion in Murray II, stating, "value 
turns on characteristics other than mineral composition, such as the 
completeness of specimen, the species of dinosaur, and how well the fossil 
is persevered."
107
 Another distinction is that fossils are not sourced and 
extracted as oil or gas but found by luck and are not valuable because of 
their mineral properties.
108
 On the contrary, the fossils are only valuable 
because they are historic.
109
 The majority concludes since the fossil is not 
rare and valuable due to its usefulness and composition, it is not under the 




C. How Fossils Relate and Effect the Surface 
The court used Heinatz as a comparison to help distinguish if these 
"fossils" were "minerals" and how they relate to the surface estate. Another 
consideration the Montana Supreme Court implemented was also how the 
"mineral" effects the surface in its extraction. Part of the Heinatz analysis 
revolves around whether limestone was related to the surface and its effect 
on the surface.
111
 The Texas Supreme Court held that limestone was related 
to the surface because it is "found exposed on the surface" and, in addition, 
is generally found on all land at "varying and usually shallow depths."
112
 In 
the case of limestone, it is "sometimes found on the top of the surface and 
removed by quarrying after scraping off the overlying caliche [sic] or other 
top soil."
113
 With this combined, the Texas Supreme Court concluded that 
because limestone is exposed near the top of the surface, and so it is part of 
the soil itself, it should be considered a part of the surface estate.
114
 
Concerning how limestone affects the surface, it is destroyed by 
quarrying the land.
115
 Quarrying found in Heinatz is a process of striping 
back land to excavate the limestone, diminishing the agricultural value of 
an additional five acres for every acre stripped.
116
 The Texas Supreme 
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Court held that this destructive manner of excavation was not indicative of 




The Montana Supreme Court moved that the non-binding Texas 
Supreme Court's analysis of limestone is analogous to fossils related to the 
soil. As with limestone sometimes being exposed on the surface, fossils can 
be found by surveying the land by driving or walking to look for a sign of a 
fossil sticking out.
118
 Like limestone, the Montana Supreme Court found 
that the soil's natural events and erosion could unearth and make fossils 
visible from the surface.
119
 Therefore, because it is so close to the surface, 
the fossils, in this case, bear a strong relation to the surface estate rather 
than the mineral estate.
120
 
The Montana Supreme Court also found that the extraction of fossils is 
very hard on the surface and affects it significantly, similar to the limestone 
in Heinatz.
121
 Because the extraction is done prudently, and it generally 
creates interferences with the use of the surface.
122
 Heinatz used the effect 
on the surface to help distinguish limestone as a part of the surface estate, 
which helped lead the Montana Supreme Court to find the same conclusion. 
The majority opinion did recognize that a panel in Murray II viewed "the 
quantity, quality, or type of substances present underneath the land may be 
unknown."
123
 Additionally, the Montana Supreme Court acknowledged the 
panel in Murray II stated that "the purpose of retaining or acquiring a 
mineral estate is to extract something valuable from that land."
124
 However, 
the Montana Court did disagree with the second premise due to the surface 
estate's effect and that the unknown value proposed does not outweigh this 
effect.
125
 The court also acknowledged that the surface right owners also 
acquired that interest to find value and should not be pushed aside by 
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V. The Concurring Opinion 
Justice Laurie McKinnon agreed with the majority's holding but wrote 
separately to distinguish a tool that could have saved the court from 
hassling with the dictionary and statutory terms. To reinforce the approach, 
Justice McKinnon displayed the disparities using both dictionary and 
statutory terms using the finding in Murray I and Murray II. In Justice 
McKinnon's example, Murray I held that these definitions "largely 
'focus[ed] the mining of hard substances or oil and gas that are primarily 
extracted for future refinement and economic purposes.'"
127
 This 
determination led the court in Murray I to find that fossils are not a part of 
the mineral estate because of Heinatz and the guidance of disregarding the 
word mineral's technical term.
128
 Subsequently, the court in Murray II 
"methodically distinguished each statutory, dictionary, and regulatory 
definition considered significant to the court in Murray I."
129
  
To further promote that dictionaries are inferior forms of analysis, Justice 
McKinnon provides that courts misuse dictionaries. Justice McKinnon 
provides that in Murray II, a definition by Murray I was secondary and 
provided no foundation for that assertion.
130
 A court could conclude that a 
dictionary meaning across various sources could provide a different 
meaning and does not provide a proper conclusion.
131
 Finally, before 
introducing their solution, Justice McKinnon explained that different 
periods of definitions only provide for the meaning during that time that 
does not expand to encompass an ordinary meaning. This is illustrated by 
Murray II that used BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY and conflated that source to 
be a common usage of "mineral."
132
 
In the concurring opinion, Justice McKinnon suggested implementing 
"[a]n electronic corpus containing a vast collection of written and spoken 
English."
133
 An electronic corpus is a database that generates the most 
common words that are paired around four words or fewer within a mineral 
from a vast amount of text.
134
 These paired words are "collocates" and, if 
used with minerals, can assess the word's attested meaning.
135
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Using "mineral" as the tested word for an electronic corpus, the most 
relevant nouns found were "resource," "oil," and "deposit."
136
 In the case of 
verbs found near "mineral" using an electronic corpus was "extract" and 
"mine."
137
 The noun "fossil" was found sixty-nine times compared to the 
other listed nouns, which received over 200 results Since the verbs and 
nouns conform closer to Murray I characterization of the ordinary meaning, 
the concurrence was persuaded with the majority's finding.
138
 Because 
mineral is not found with fossil and cannot be attributed to that definition, it 
could not be a part of the mineral estate.  
VI. The Dissenting Opinion 
The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Ingrid Gustafson, criticized 
the majority in the same order as its analysis; therefore, it moved from the 
certifying question and then through each factor. The first divergence was 
the interpretation of the certifying question by the majority opinion. Justice 
Gustafson interpreted the certifying question as being narrower and a fact-
specific inquiry compared to the broad overarching analysis that Justice 
Laurie McKinnon applied in the majority opinion.
139
 The dissent cited that 
this was a fact-specific situation due to precedent such as Farley and Hart 
being fact-intensive opinions.
140
 Therefore the dissent phrased the certifying 
question as follows, "[w]hether, under Montana law, these dinosaur fossils 
constitute 'minerals' for the purpose of a mineral reservation."
141
 
Justice Gustafson favored the two-prong approach by Montana precedent 
of Farley that created the first prong regarding whether the substance 
comprised of minerals and secondly whether the substance is rare and 
exception or possession a peculiar property giving it value.
142
 The two facts 
that weighed in BEJ's favor in the analysis of this test would be the parties 
did not dispute the mineral composition being 100% of the fossils found 
and the undisputed fact they were monetarily valuable.
143
 Instead, the 
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dissent criticized the long search of statues for determining "mineral" in its 
first prong by pointing out inconsistencies in its analysis. The first was the 
use of MCA § 82-4-303(16) that defines a mineral as "any ore, rock, or 
substance . . . that is taken from below the surface or from the surface of the 
earth for . . . other subsequent use."
144
 The fossils met this definition that 
the majority cited by being taken from the surface and used subsequently 
for scientific research and exhibits.
145
 Another relevant statute cited by the 
dissent is MCA § 15-38-103(3) that defined "mineral" to be products that 
are "nonrenewable merchantable products extracted from the surface or 
subsurface of the state of Montana."
146
 Fossils are not renewable and are 
very sought-after products that, in this case, were extracted from the state of 
Montana and, according to the dissent, met the definition of the statute.
147
 
The dissent pointed out that a scientific determination would have been a 
better alternative to struggling through statutes that purport many different 
meanings.
148
 The alternative proposed is to shift through statues and 
discredit the parties for not expressly indicating dinosaurs' fossils in the 
mineral deed.
149
 In this case, it was agreed upon that neither party had even 
a fleeting thought about fossils being a portion retained or conveyed.
150
 The 
dissent deemed the majority "whittles its meaning in the deed down to 
nothingness by finding the failure to affirmatively, and prospectively, list a 
substance which is 100% composed of minerals in a mineral reservation 
somehow means that a substance is now a mineral."
151
 
According to Justice Gustafson, the majority created an entirely new test 
that stripped away the original test under Hart and Farley.
152
 The dissent 
pointed out that Heinatz and its language being "to the rare and exceptional 
qualities of the substance, not its mineral composition."
153
 The dissent 
points out the disparities in this logic by an analogous example of diamonds 
and fossils.
154
 Diamonds are made of carbon atoms, which are an abundant 
element that is not rare.
155
 According to the majority's new test, diamonds 
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are not rare and valuable because they are composed of carbon, which was 
abundant. Fossils would fall under the same logic as they are composed of 
"hydroxyapatite and/or francolite, which are not necessarily rare and 
valuable on their own."
156
  
The last substantive point the dissent made is its criticism of what the 
opinion called "grafting on a third prong."
157
 The dissent recognized that the 
substance's relation to the surface was mentioned in Heinatz but never 
adopted in the controlling precedent of Hart and Farley, which only 
provided for the two-prong test. Furthermore, Judge Gustafson and the 
dissent suggested the need itself to the indicated relation of the surface that 
is required in the analysis by the language. “All right title and interest in 
and to all of the oil, gas, hydrocarbons, and minerals in, on and under, and 
that may be produced from the [property] (emphasis added)."
158
 By that 
language, the deed demonstrated the parties contemplated the existence of 
minerals on the surface and did not need to be examined by the court.
159
 
VII. Argument in Support of the Dissenting Opinion 
Justice Gustafson indicated a problem that will soon arise from the 
opinion by stating, "[T]he Court today has upended this simple and clear 
guidance. To reach such a result, the Court crafts an new, convoluted, and 
opaque three-factor test that will spawn more questions than it answers."
160
 
The narrow scope of the problem of finding fossils in Montana specifically 
is now alleviated due to the Montana Legislature in 2019 passing legislation 
that allocated fossils under the surface estate unless clearly and expressly 
conveyed in the mineral deed.
161
 While it is now statutorily provided in 
Montana, that does not alleviate what the majorities new test may do in the 
future for other states in which a similar scenario happens with either fossils 
or a "mineral" that has not been determined yet. For example, suppose a 
state were to have little case law in the area of mineral determination. In 
that case, the Murray decisions could lead to this outcome, which has 
circumvented the precedent available through Hart and Farley as well as a 
foundational case as Heinatz. Because the majority opinion's persuasive 
implications are a dual threat to the analysis of not just fossils but other 
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undetermined minerals on where they belong among the surface or mineral 
estate, it is important to criticize the lack of clarity and disregard for 
precedent the majority demonstrated. 
The majority and dissent are split on the certifying question's scope, 
transforming the inquiry from a more fact-specific inquiry or a broad 
inquiry.
162
 The dissent provided that the certifying question should be 
interpreted narrowly.
163
 Under Montana law, the Montana Supreme Court 
may reformulate the question upon receiving the certifying question.
164
 The 
majority's broad inquiry argument is stymied because the Montana 
legislature already answered the broad question, which leaves a fact 
intensive inquiry suggested by the dissent.
165
 The main determination in 
light of MCA § 1-4-112 only leaves the implications, in this case, to follow 
precedent and use a fact-specific inquiry.  
Following Farley and Hart's precedent, the analysis scientifically is 
analogous, which both were found to be minerals, but absent a rare and 
exceptional character. Scoria, in the case of Farley, was found to have 
100% mineral composition.
166
 As well as in Hart, the composition of 
sandstone was 100%.
167
 It should have a greater weight ordinarily that 
fossils are composed of 100% minerals, such as hydroxylapatite and/or 
francolite, in the majority opinion.
168
 Regardless, there is a flaw and 
uncertainty of looking at the dictionary and statutory definitions.
169
 Even 
more evident is the concurring opinion, written by Justice McKinnon, 
suggesting the use of an electronic corpus that has clear flaws.
170
 MCA § 
82-4-303(16) provides a clear example of disagreement.
171
 The Murrays 
proposed this statute as a reinforcement, but the dissent counters that it does 
meet that being a substance made of minerals, taken from the surface for 
use in exhibits. The majority rebutted this proposition that fossils' mineral 
properties do not make them valuable compared to the properties of oil and 
gas that makes them valuable. However, the second prong in Farley that 
was clear in Heinatz there is a portion to evaluate value and use. The 
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analogy used is diamonds not being valuable because the properties of 
diamonds are carbon, which is abundant.
172
 It is hard to reconcile that 
diamonds are not valuable.  
The dissent is persuasive in this fact because it clearly demonstrates that 
statues vary in context and change the meaning of what constitutes a 
"mineral."
173
 The capability to determine the composition of a substance 
can be distinguished as a mineral that should take a more significant portion 
in the ordinary and natural meaning of a mineral. The dissent phrases this 
distinction as, "[T]he Court should accept the undisputed fact that these 
fossils are scientifically minerals, recognize that the definition of mineral 
can differ according to the context in which it is used, and move on to the 
second part of Farley test." It is hard to reconcile that because the 
distinction was not contemplated in the mineral deed, the ordinary meaning 
of minerals and a fossil that had a composition of 100% minerals would not 
be in that substance bearing clear statute.  
The majority cites the following for their argument that the composition 
of a mineral is what is determined as rare and valuable, "In our opinion 
substances . . . are not minerals within the ordinary and natural meaning of 
the word unless they are rare and exceptional character or possess a peculiar 
peripety giving them special value."
174
 The court claimed this speaks to the 
resourcefulness demonstrated in Hart because sandstone does not have to 
be changed to be used commercially.
175
 The dissent continues a functional 
analysis of a diamond, rare and valuable outside of its composition of 
carbon. There is no indication in Heinatz that mineral composition is what 
must be valued monetarily or rare. The explicit language speaks to the 
substance.
176
 The substance is not to be confused with composition but to 
be the fossil itself or, in the dissent's analogy, the diamond itself.  
The dissent correctly points out that this expanded reading of Heinatz to 
include an effect on the surface factor is not seen in Hart and Farley's 
precedent cases. This prong also creates doubt and uncertainty for the 
future. Therefore, because it is a factor in the analysis, there must be 
thorough discussion and building of case law to establish the depths of the 
surface estate and mineral estate, and there they split.
177
 Another dimension 
to the factor on if the depth is an issue or is it the destruction that the 
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extraction causes that is the determination?
178
 This determination was not a 
consideration in Montana and now confuses an opinion that was decided to 
bring clarity. With all three factors being established, it is clear that the 
dissent follows precedent instead of creating a new grafted factored list to 
determine minerals in Montana. 
VIII. Conclusion 
Statutorily it is now a non-issue that fossils are a part of the surface 
estate and decided in favor of the Murray's. However, an issue will soon 
arise in other states where fossils or other minerals are found. Courts could 
incline to use the line of Murray cases to be persuasive in subsequent 
outcomes. However, the dissenting opinion should be the most persuasive 
as it provides the necessary interpretation consistent in Heinatz, Farley, and 
Hart that would have made this analysis logical and linear. Because it 
correctly follows precedent and disproves every point, and creates a new 
test to stray away from precedent, it is the sound and logical opinion that 
should have prevailed. 
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